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The problem.--The problem of the study is to
determine how well or badly the growth of selected Negro
life insurance companies compares with the growth of simi¬
lar white selected life insurance companies.
The hypothesis.--The basic hypothesis is that, on
the basis of press reports, such as the one quoted below,
the growth of the Negro life insurance companies is slower
than that of the white companies. Unless causes for this
difference in growth are sought and remedies are recommend¬
ed and acted upon, the Negro companies will not be able to
successfully compete with white companies in the constantly
changing and highly competitive American economy.
In expressing concern over the reported slow growth
of Negro life insurance companies, a Negro leader remarked:
The type of growth needed by us is not hasty and can¬
cerous growth,..but a growth in keeping with the ad¬
vances of the industry as a whole and not measured by
the miniature yardstick of our own accomplishments.^
. L Simon, "President's Page," The Pilot, VII
(Third Quarter, 1958), 5.
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The pu2nDOse of the study.--The purpose of the study
is:
1. To determine how well or badly the growth of the
Negro life insurance companies compares with that
of the white companies.
2. To search for causes that contribute to whatever
growth differences are found to exist between the
two groups of companies.
3. To recommend courses of action to deal with the
findings of the study.
Definition of terms.—For the purpose of this study,
Negro life insurance companies are companies started, owned,
and managed mainly by Negroes. White life insurance compa¬
nies are companies which, although employ Negroes, were
started and remain owned and managed largely by whites.
Limitations of the study.--Not all the companies
studied responded to the request for copies of their ac¬
counting statements. So, it was more convenient and ade¬
quate for this study to survey mostly the literature on in¬
dividual life insurance reports in the field and use the
Descriptive Survey Method of Research for the study.
The basis on which the Negro life insurance compa¬
nies included in this study were selected depended on whether
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or not the Negro oompanies happened to be operating in
Atlanta, Georgia. All those that were operating in Atlanta,
Georgia, were included, and these happened to be four.
This was'not the case with the other companies.
Their selection depended upon their admitted assets as of
December 31, 1958. The sole basis for selection was for
each prospective company for selection to have admitted as¬
sets equal, as nearly as possible, to its counter Negro com-
pany^'s admitted assets as of December 31, 1958--the origi¬
nally intended year of beginning the study through 1962.
The basis was retained because of the insignificant effect
it would have on the results of the study under the changed
period.
Growth and performance of each company and group of
companies--the Negro and the white group of companies—from
1953, and in some cases, from 1955 to 1958 and thereafter to
1962, provide a basis for comparison of the two groups.
Procedures and sources of data.--Besides visiting
the offices of the Negro life insurance companies operating
in Atlanta, Georgia, to observe service there as customers
walked in and out, et cetera, more data was secured from:
1. Best's Life Insurance Reports 1954-1963.
2. American Life Convention Reports 1953-1962.
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3. Proceedings of the Forty-Third Annual Session
Report of the National Insurance Association,
1963.
4. Informal discussions with graduate social workers,
employees of some of the companies, and current
as well as prospectiwe Negro policyholders in the
Negro life insurance companies.
5. Books, previous studies undertaken, magazines,
newspapers, and radio reports.
The Negro companies.--The Negro companies included
in the study are: The Afro-American Life Insurance Company,
Atlanta Life Insurance Company, North Carolina Mutual Life
Insurance Company, and the Pilgrim Health and Life Insurance
Company.
The Afro-American Life Insurance Company was founded
in 1901; and by 1962, it was operating in Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, and Texas. Its shares were $100 par value. Atlanta
Life was founded in 1916; and by 1962, it was operating in
eleven states: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas,
Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, Tennessee, and Texas.
Its capital was made up of common stock shares at $100 par
value at the end of 1962.
North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company began
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business in 1899. By 1962, it was licensed to operate in
fourteen states: District of Columbia, Alabama, California,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and
Virginia. It was also authorized to solicit business among
Americans abroad. The Pilgrim Health and Life Insurance
Company was started in 1898. At the end of 1962, it was
only operating in four southern states: Georgia, Alabama,
South Carolina, and Florida. Its capital stock was divided
into common stocks at $100 par value.
The other selected companies.--These are: Fidelity
Union Life Insurance Company, Great Northwest Life Insurance
Company, Guaranty Income Life Insurance Company, and National
Reserve Life Insurance Company.
Fidelity Life Insurance Company began operations in
1927. By the end of 1962, it was already licensed to oper¬
ate in forty-two widely scattered areas such as Hawaii to
Florida and Washington to California. Its common shares
that formed the basis of its capital were $10 par value,
but sold at $20 at the end of 1962.
Great Northwest Life Insurance Company started busi¬
ness in 1928. After thirty-four years, that is, at the end
of 1962, it operated in seven states: California, Hawaii
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Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. Its capital
was at first made up of common shares at $100 par value,
and sold at $150. Then in 1961, the shares were split into
$10 par value.
Guaranty Income Life Insurance Company began opera¬
tions in 1926. By 1962, it had extended business operations
into eight states: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and New Mexico. At the end
of the same period, its shares were $1 par value. The Na¬
tional Reserve Life Insurance Company was also started in
the twentieth century—1919. It had both common and pre¬
ferred shares at $10 par value up to the end of 1962. In
1963, it then split the shares into $1 par value.
On the basis of the two preceding sub-headings on
the Negro and the other selected companies, three character¬
istics stand out. First, all the Negro companies in the
study are older than any in the other group. The latest
Negro company to begin business is the Atlanta Life Insur¬
ance Company which began in 1916. And the oldest among the
Negro companies is the Pilgrim Health and Life Insurance
Company which was founded in 1898.
On the other hand, the other selected group of com¬
panies has, as its oldest company, the National Reserve Life
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Insurance Company which started operations in 1919--three
years later than the latest formed company among the Negro
companies. Then, the most recent founded among the other
companies is the Great Northwest Life Insurance Company. In
1928 it commenced business.
Secondly, total and spread of operations in areas
as reported by Best's Life Insurance Reports, at the end of
1962, the Negro group was operating in thirty-three areas
confined mostly to the Southern United States. The other
group was operating in eighty-seven areas more widely spread
out in the United States.
The third characteristic was that the Negro stock
companies had their shares at $100 par value.
CHAPTER II
MEASURES OF GROWTH--AN ANALYSIS
OF THE DATA
Of the many factors that may be considered measures
of growth for life insurance companies, the following are
selected for major exploration in this study: (a) admitted
assets, (b) net yield, (c) insurance in force, (d) lapse
ratio, (e) operating expenses, and (f) balance sheet and in^
come statement ratio analysis.
Admitted assets.--A look at Table I, page 9, in
which the asset growth of the two groups of companies is
compared, reveals that:
(a) At the end of 1953, the total admitted as¬
sets of the Negro companies exceeded those
of the other group by $14,735,000. By 1958,
this difference had been reduced to $194,000
At the end of 1962, the total assets of the
white companies exceeded those of the Negro
by $23,492,000.
(b) The percentage increase of both groups was
8
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higher in the early part of the study. The
increase of the Negro companies ranged from
9.83 per cent in 1954 to 5.4 per cent in
1962. That of the white companies ranged
from 12.50 per cent in 1954 to 8.82 per cent
in 1962.
TABLE 1
GROWTH OF ADMITTED ASSETS
(In Thousands of Dollars)
Negro Companies White Companies
Year Total Admitted Percentage Total Admitted Percentage
Assets Increase Assets Increase
1953 88,726 73,991
1954 97,452 9.83 83,240 12.50
1955 106,293 9.07 93,843 12.73
1956 114,733 7.94 103,888 10.70
1957 121,776 6.14 115,799 11.47
1958 129,846 6.63 129,652 11.96
1959 137,223 5.69 141,557 9.18
1960 143,117 4.30 153,712 8.59
1961 150,676 5.28 167,528 8.99
1962 158,814 5.40 182,306 8.82
60.28 94.94
Nine year Nine year
average increase 6.70 average increase 10.56
Source of Data: Best^s Life Insurance Reports,
1956-1963.
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(c) The average increase of the Negro companies
was 6.70 per cent; and that of the white
companies was 10.56 per cent, 3.86 per cent
higher than that of the Negro companies.
Investment yield.--Figures used in this analysis
were obtained from Best's Life Insurance Reports. In these
reports, rates of return on investments are calculated on
an earned income basis. Bond income is adjusted for accrual
of discount and armortization of premium items. Mortgages
are net after direct expenses. Real estate is net after re¬
pairs, taxes, and depreciation. No deduction is made for
overhead.
An analysis of information in Best's shows that
Negro investment average yield for eight years was just
slightly below that of the white group of companies. The
yield of bonds held by the Negro group was 3.24 per cent;
that of white - 3.71 per cent. Mortgage gross yield for
the Negro group was 5.28 per cent; that of white - 5.48 per
cent. Net yield was 5.24 for the Negro companies, and 5.42
per cent for the white companies.
Also, eight-year stock average yield for the Negro
companies was 3.93 while that of the white companies was
3.89. Here the average stock yield of the white companies
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is slightly lower than that of the Negro companies because
one of the white companies had no investment in stocks until
1962. Individual white company stock investment yield was
generally higher than that of individual Negro companies.
Real estate gross yield for the Negro was 10.18; white,
13.92. Net yield for the Negro group was 1.74, whereas
that of white was 3.56.
In the order of profitable investment outlets,
mortgage yield was the highest--5.24 for the Negro group
and 5.42 for the white; then stocks, for the Negro, and
3.89 for the white group. Real Estate net yield comes last
with 1.73 for the Negro, and 3.56 for the white.
Comparison of investment practices of the group,
1958-1962.--As Table 2, page 12, shows, both the Negro com¬
panies as a group and the other selected group of companies
invested in the regular outlets for life insurance companies'
funds. These are bonds—mostly government, federal and
state,--stocks, mortgage loans, real estates, policy loans,
and other outlets, such as collateral loans used by some
companies at times. Of the studied companies, only North
Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company is reported to have
used collateral loans in the years 1958-1962.
TABLE 2
INVESTMENT PERCENTAGES NEGRO AND WHITE
COMPANIES 1958-1962*
Bonds Stocks Mortgages Real Estate Policy Loans Cash , etc. Per
Year Negro White Negro White Negro White Negro White Negro White Negro White Cent
1958 65 38 6 3 16 42 4 5 4 6 5 6 iOO
1959 65 38 6 3 18 43 4 4 2 6 5 6 100
I960 65 36 6 3 18 44 4 4 3 7 4 6 100
1961 64 34 7 5 17 43 4 4 3 7 5 7 100
1962 62 35 8 6 18 43 3 3 3 7 6 6 100
*Source: Calculated from Best^s Life Insurance Reports, 1959-1963.
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When the two groups are compared, one sees that the
Negro companies as a group had most of its invested assets
tied up in bonds. This was so in the years 1958, 1959, and
1960, when 65 per cent of the group's assets were invested
in bonds. Then the percentage fell to 64 in 1961, and down
to 62 per cent by the end of 1962.
Stocks remained constant at 6 per cent of admitted
assets from 1958 through 1960. By the end of 1961, stocks
were 7 per cent; and then rose to 8 per cent by 1962. Mort¬
gage loans varied from 16 per cent to 18 per cent, dropped
to 17 per cent in 1961, and then returned to 18 per cent by
1962. Real estate remained 4 per cent through 1961, after
which the investment dropped to 3 per cent of the assets.
Policy loans dropped from 4 per cent to 3 per cent in 1960,
and remained so for the rest of the period.
Sundry assets were 5 per cent at the beginning of
the period, dropped to 4 per cent in 1960, and then rose to
6 per cent by 1962. Cash was the major portion of the sun¬
dry assets. It exceeded the cash of the other group, most
probably because, as it will be seen later, the Negro group
wrote more industrial policies than the other group; and
these policies require more cash (liquid funds) to pay for
the extra expenses called for by business in such policies
14
compared to the business expenses ordinary policies require.
A further look at the same table shows that the
other selected group of companies had more of their assets
tied up in mortgage loans. The bonds held dropped from
38 per cent in 1958 to 34 per cent, 1961; and then rose to
35 per cent in 1962. Stocks remained 3 per cent to 1960,
and then increased to 6 per cent by 1962.
On the other hand, mortgage loans were 42 per cent
at the end of 1958, rose to 44 per cent by 1960; and then
dropped to 43 per cent by 1962. Real estate dropped from
5 per cent to 3 per cent by the end of the period. Policy
loans were 6 per cent to begin with, turned up to 7 per
cent, and then returned to 6 per cent by 1962. Sundry as¬
sets were the same 6 per cent from 1958 to 1962; and the
major item in the sundry assets was life and annuity pre¬
miums .
Net yield.--According to Best's Life Insurance Re¬
ports , comment on net yield:
Is based upon the ratio of net investment income to
net invested assets, plus accrued investment income
modified by a half year's interest. This is based
on the average of the life insurance industry as a
whole which was $4.34 per cent in 1962.1
^Best's Life Insurance Reports, 1963.
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On the basis of this policy, the Negro companies'
yield on assets was below average. Those of the other group
had average or above average yield. Taking 1961, as a rep¬
resentative year, for instance. North Carolina Mutual as¬
sets' yield was 3.68 per cent; and Best commented, "a low
rate of return." Pilgrim Health and Life Insurance Company
had 3.30 per cent, "a very low return." Atlanta Life--
3.24 per cent, "a very low return"; and no comment for the
Afro-American Life Insurance Company was given by Best, the
life insurance company reporter.
On the other hand, the yield and comments for the
other companies were different. The National Reserve Life
Insurance yield on its assets was 4.31 per cent, and the
examiners commented, "an average rate of return." Guaranty
Income Life--4.69 per cent, "a good rate of return."
Fidelity Life--4.70 per cent, "a very good rate." And the
Great Northwest return on its assets was 4.32 per cent, "an
average rate of return."
Final averages in Table 3 show that the net yield
of the Negro companies was almost 1 per cent less than the
average yield of the white companies. One of the causes for
this is probably due to the fact that, as the table shows,
the Negro companies retained about 65 per cent of their
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investments in bonds which were earning less than Mortgages
during the time. The white life insurance companies, on
the contrary, according to Table 3, transferred most of
their investments into mortgages when mortgage net yield
was higher than that of any other investment outlet.
TABLE 3
















Source of figures: Best^s Life Insurance Reports.
1956-1963.
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The higher net yield for the white companies meant
that investments of their reserve funds earned more for them
than the reserve funds for the Negro companies earned. The
white companies could therefore ask for less premiums than
the Negro companies could competitively do. In such a case,
it can be assumed that the chances for the white companies
to write more insurance policies were enhanced, thus lead¬
ing to faster growth of both assets and insurance in force
for the white companies compared with the growth of the
Negro companies.
Insurance in force.--Insurance in force in life
insurance companies falls into two major t3rpes--ordinary
and industrial.
The ordinary is generally sub-divided into term,
group, and additions. The ordinary life insurance policies
are usually taken by individuals for $1,000 or more, and
paid at the company's office on an annual, semi-annual, or
quarterly basis. On the other hand, industrial or as they
are sometimes called, nickel and dime insurance policies are
issued in small amounts, sometimes less than $500, and paid
for even on weekly basis at a rate as low as 5 cents. Fur¬
thermore, the premiums are frequently collected at the homes
of policyholders. Consequently, industrial insurance
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policies are comparatively much more expensive than ordi¬
nary policies; and they are expensive both to the policy¬
holder and the company. They are expensive to the policy¬
holder because he ends up paying more than the whole life
policyholder for equal protection. And it is also expensive
for the company issuing mainly industrial policies because
its net profit is most likely bound to be less than that of
a company issuing more ordinary policies because of the
extra expenses required to collect and administer industrial
premiums. The less profit for companies issuing mainly in¬
dustrial policies may be avoided by asking for very high
premiums which, in the long run, might limit the growth of
life insurance in force. In other words, the higher the
premiums a company asks compared with others, the less
policyholders it is likely to have as time passes by.
Reference to Table 4, page 19, indicates that the
Negro companies issued both ordinary and industrial policies.
The industrial policies were about 69 per cent of the in¬
surance in force in 1953. By the end of 1962, the percent¬
age had dropped to about 60 per cent. The average increase
of the industrial policies was 2.48 per cent, while the in¬
crease of ordinary policies was at the rate of 6.58 per
cent. The total average growth rate as shown in the table
TABLE 4
INSURANCE IN FORCE












1953 140,206-31% 305,365-69% 445,571
1954 149,974 6.90 308,826 1.07 458,800 2.97
1955 164,551 9.80 314,760 1.92 479,311 4.47
1956 176,124 7.03 322 321 2.40 498.445 4.00
1957 188,738 7.16 324,760 .76 513,498 3.02
1958 198,182 5.00 326,168 .43 524,352 2.14
1959 208,988 5.46 332,844 2.05 541,821 3.33
1960 223,397 6.90 337,822 1.50 561,219 3.58
1961 238,475 6.75 342,018 1.24 580,492 3.43














TABLE 4 - Continued
The White Companies
Increase Increase Total Insurance Increase
Ordinary Per Cent Industrial Per Cent in Force Per Cent
386,035 ■ ■ . • 386,035
444,971 15.27 • ■ ■ • 444,971 15.27
526,125 18.24 526,125 18.24
622,028 18.22 ■ ■ 622,028 18.22
698,385 12.24 • ■ 698,385 12.24
767,104 9.84 ■ • 767,104 9.84
861,003 12.26 ■ ■ 861,003 12.26
951,180 10.46 ■ ■ 951,180 10.46
1,020,923 8.38 ■ ■ 1,020,923 8.38




was 3.90 per cent.
The same table indicates that the white insurance
companies issued no industrial policies before or during the
period under study. They issued only ordinary policies.
These policies increased growth of insurance in force at
the average rate of 12.75 per cent from 1954 to 1962. The
rate was higher in the early part of the study. The rate
of growth for the white companies was also higher than that
of the Negro companies by an average rate of 9.85 per cent.
On the whole, it can be said that the Negro compa¬
nies still issue and own fewer ordinary policies than in¬
dustrial policies of which lapse ratio as well as collec¬
tion and administrative escpenses are higher than those of
the ordinary policies.
Lapse ratio.--According to Life Insurance Fact Book:
A policy lapses when it is terminated before it has ac¬
cumulated a surrender value. A policy is surrendered
when it is terminated after it has developed a surrender
value, usually after one or two years in force.... The
voluntary termination rate varies widely with individual
companies, since it is influenced by the types of
policies issued, the relationship between the number of
new policies issued and the total number in force, the
manner of premium payment, and other persistency fac¬
tors
^Lapses and Surrenders, Life Insurance Fact Book
(New York: Institute of Life Insurance, 1959), p. 51.
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Lapses are expensive both to the policyholder and
the insurer. They are expensive to the insurer when most
lapses take place before the policyholder pays sufficient
premiums to pay for the expenses of acquiring and maintain¬
ing the policies on the books. So, the lower the lapse
rate a company has, most likely, the better is its operat¬
ing expenses and the public image in which it is held.
The Negro companies, according to Table 5, have
2.8 higher average lapse ratio than the selected white com¬
panies . For life insurance companies issuing mainly indus¬
trial policies, high lapse ratio is usually expected be¬
cause, as Davis writes;
(a) Changing economic conditions hit industrial
workers harder. During a depression, many more indus¬
trial workers holding industrial policies are likely
to be laid off than workers of other employment hold¬
ing ordinary policies; and those laid off fail to meet
their premium obligations.
(b) Greater opportunity to lapse because of the 52
chances, since collection of premium is usually weekly
as opposed to the annual payment of ordinary policies.
(c) Lack of budgeting experience is evident among
most industrial workers. When they have regular income,
they may meet their commitment; but they generally do
not plan for bad days. So, when economic conditions are
unfavorable to them, they fail to pay their premiums,
thus allowing their policies to lapse.^
^Malvin E. Davis, Industrial Life Insurance (New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1944), p. 204.
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TABLE 5
AVERAGE LAPSE RATIO FOR TRE PERIOD,
1955-1962*











*Sourcei Best^s Life Insurance Report, 1956-63.
At the same time, lapses retard growth, increase
operating expenses, and may create bad public relations for
the company which can be accused of improper selling and
poorly trained sales force. Therefore, there should be
sustained effort to shift selling effort from industrial
policies to ordinary policies.
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Operating expenses.--For the period 1956 to 1962,
average total assets for the Negro companies increased from
$28,683,000 to $39,704,000. Total average expenses for
same period rose from $3,284,000 to $4,453,000.
Final asset average for the seven year period was,
as Table 6 on the next page shows, $34,135,000. Expense
average for same period was $3,829,000. This made total
average expenses for the Negro companies 11 per cent of the
total asset average. Table 6 shows, too, that average
premium for the Negro companies, ordinary was $32.55 and
all business--$39.66. Average policy was 1121.71; and re¬
newal expenses ratio per thousand was 6.17 for ordinary
policy, and 6.83 for all business.
During the same period, 1956 to 1962, total average
assets for white companies increased from $25,972,000 to
$45,577,000. For the seven year duration, total expenses
averages increased from $2,159,000 to $2,656,000. Asset
average for the seven years was $35,516,000, and expenses
$2,175,000. This made the seven year total average expenses
for the white companies about 6 per cent of the average as¬
sets for the same period.
On an average basis of assets and expenses, there¬
fore, the Negro companies had about 5 per cent higher
TABLE 6
SIGNIFICANT OPERATING EXPENSES OF SELECTED














1956 28,683 3,284 35.71 41.85 1,006 6.68 6.90
1957 30,444 3,382 32.96 40 .16 1,039 7.14 6.93
1958 32,462 3,578 33.48 39.79 1,079 5.99 6.73
1959 34,206 3,897 32.79 39.50 1,108 6.31 6.99
1960 35,779 4,064 31.47 38.90 1.155 5.77 6.71
1961 37,669 4,144 30.74 38.20 1,204 5.60 6.62
1962 39,704 4,453 30,73 39.23 1,258 5.70 6.96
238,947 26,802 227.88 277.63 7,849 43.19 47.84
Average 34,135 3,829 32.55 39.66 1,121 6.17 6.84
Source: Best's Life Insurance Reports, 1957-1963.
Spectator Life Index. 1957-1963.
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expenses than the white companies.
At the same time. Table 7 demonstrates that the
seven year average premium for the white companies—ordinary
was $29.09, $3.46 less than that of the Negro group. All
business premium was $29.47, $10.19 less than that of the
Negro group. Renewal ratio expenses--ordinary was 5.94,
and for all business was 5.98, both of which were lower
than those of the Negro companies.
In short, the Negro group had higher operating ex:-
penses than the white companies. As a result, they asked
for higher premiums compared with what the other companies
asked for. This course of action could drive away many
prospective policyholders to the other companies, thus ac¬
celerating the growth of the white companies to the detri¬
ment of Negro companies.
Selected ratio analysis.--An examination was made
of the financial position and the operating activity of the
selected companies for the period 1955-1962, the results of
which are shown in Table 8, pages 29 and 30.
According to Best^s Life Insurance Reports, net op¬
erating profits for the Negro companies during 1955-1962, on
an accrual basis, totalled $19,460,266. This was net total
profits after both federal and state insurance taxes; but
TABLE 7
SIGNIFICANT OPERATING EXPENSES OF SELECTED














1956 25,972 2,159 30.38 30.96 3,373 6.28 6.36
1957 28,950 1,865 29.89 30.71 3,570 6.15 6.22
1958 32,413 1,806 31.95 30.16 3,685 5.93 5.87
1959 35,389
^
2,180 28.84 29.65 3,431 6.06 6.16
1960 38,428 2,291 28.38 29.07 4,085 5.75 5.85
1961 41,882 2,268 27.74 28.41 4,252 5.75 5.62
1962 45,577 2,656 26.42 27.33 4,569 5.69 5.79
248,611 15,225 203.80 206.29 26,965 41.61 41.87
Average 35,516 2,175 29.11 29.47 3,852 5.94 5.98
Source: Best^'s Life Insurance Reports, 1957-1963.
Spectator Life Index, 1957-1963.
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before policy and stockholders' dividends.
During the same period and on the same basis, net
total operating profits for the white companies amounted to
$17,225,888. This was $2,234,378 less than net profits
earned by the Negro companies.
In terms of yearly totals and percentage ratios,
total net profits for the Negro companies was only
$1,550,523 for the year ending December 31, 1961. This was
the lowest during the 1955 through 1962 period. It was
1.10 per cent of total assets. Highest profit percentage
of assets was 2.53 for 1956; and the average net profit
from operations to asset average for the period 1955-1962,
as shown in Table 8, was 1.81 per cent.
On the other hand, during the same period, the white
group of companies had its lowest net profit in 1956. It
was $1,215,521; and this was 1.17 per cent of total assets.
The most profitable year was 1961, during which year profit
earned was $2,974,394. This was 1.76 per cent of total as¬
sets. Average profit for the period was $2,165,736--1.59 per
cent of average total assets. This was .22 per cent less
than the same ratio percentage for the Negro companies.
Regarding net profit to owners' equity, the white
companies' ratio was higher than that of the Negro companies.
TABLE 8
SELECTED RATIOS OF BALANCE SHEET AND INCOME STATEMENTS
FOR THE YEARS 1955-1962
Items Group 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 Average
Net Profit from Opera¬













































































































































































TABLE 8 - Continued















































































































*Th.e number of times assets cover liabilities;
all other figures represent percentages.
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The lowest ratio was 10.36 per cent for the year ending
1956; while the highest was 18.01 per cent for the year
ending 1961. The average was 14.35 per cent.
The lowest ratio for the Negro group was 5.11 per
cent in 1961. The highest ratio was 17.57 per cent for
the year ending 1958. The average was 9.97 per cent. As
far as the study could reveal, no specific reason could be
given for having better ratios for the white group of com¬
panies when the ratios for the Negro group were bad. One
thing is clear. On the basis of total net profits earned,
the Negro group with cumulative total profits of $19,460,266,
did better than the white group with $17,225,888 cumulative
profits. The group had $2,234,378 more net profits than
the white group. How did this come about?
Besides the few ratios mentioned in the preceeding
discussion on profits earned, a few more will be considered.
They will enable the reader to analyze the causes of suc¬
cesses or failures, and make recommendations where called
for.
Owners' equity to total assets' ratio for the Negro
companies was higher than that of the white companies. The
lowest was 17.49 per cent for the year ending 1960; and the
highest was 28.89 per cent as of December 31, 1956. The
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average for the period was 20.34 per cent.
The same ratio for the white group was almost half
that of the Negro group. Its average was 11.06 per cent,
8.28 per cent less than that of the Negro group. The
lowest ratio was 9.76 per cent at the end of 1961. The
highest was 12.05 per cent for the year ending December 31,
1958.
Average ratio of dividend to net operating profit
for the Negro group was 39.27 per cent. The Negro compa¬
nies transferred greater share of the profits into the un¬
assigned and special surplus funds which, together with the
capital, were taken to form the owners' equity.
On the other hand, the white group of companies'
average ratio of dividend to net operation profit was 56.54
per cent. This was 29.27 per cent higher than that of the
Negro companies. Consequently, there was comparatively
less of the white companies' profits added to the owners'
equity yearly. As a result, the total average equity of
the white companies was $15,046,015. That of the Negro com¬
panies was $25,564,634 - $10,518,619 more than the total
average equity of the white companies,
Therefore, partly because the owners' equity of the
Negro companies was higher than that of the white companies.
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and partly because yearly dividend to profit ratio of the
Negro companies was lower than that of the white companies,
the average dividend to owners' equity ratio of the Negro
companies was much less than that of the white companies.
It was 3.39 per cent. But that of the white companies was
7.87 -- 4.50 per cent higher than that of the Negro group.
The lowest ratio for the Negro group was 2.28 per cent in
1956. The highest was 3.84 per cent for the year ending
1960. The white companies' highest ratio was 9.06 per cent
for the year ending 1961; and 6.00 per cent the lowest for
1955.
The average assets to average liability ratio for
the Negro companies was 1.23 times. This was .7 times more
than that of the white companies of which ratio was 1.16
times. It was so because the average owners' equity to
average total assets of the white companies was less than
that of the Negro companies.
. The average ratio of commissions to premiums re¬
ceived for the Negro companies was 24.26 per cent. The
white companies had a ratio of 17.25 per cent--7.01 per cent
less than the Negro companies. The higher ratio for the
Negro companies can partly be justified on the grounds that
the Negro companies issued mainly industrial policies for
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which premi-um collection is much more costly than premium
collection for ordinary policies.
Net investment income to total assets ratio revealed
that the Negro companies had an average of 3.05 per cent.
The white companies had 3.69 per cent. This was .64 per
cent more favorable than that of the Negro companies.
The average net investment income to total income
ratio for the Negro companies was 11.84 per cent. The
highest was 13.47 per cent for the year ending 1960; while
9.88 per cent for the year ending 1955 was the lowest ratio.
On the other hand, the average ratio for the white
companies was 18.14 per cent--6.30 per cent higher than
that of the Negro companies. The lowest ratio for the white
companies was 15.92 per cent as of December 31, 1956. The
highest was 21.33 per cent for the year ending December 31,
1962. The range was therefore 5.41 per cent.
Regarding premium received to total income ratio,
the Negro companies had an average of 85.14 per cent against
77.31 per cent of the white companies.
Turning to expenses, other expenses to premium re¬
ceived ratio shows that Negro companies had an average of
22.67 per cent. The white companies had an average of 19.27
per cent--3.40 per cent more favorable than the Negro
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companies.
Average ratio of other expenses to total expenses
was 21.38 per cent for the Negro, and 16.25 per cent for
the white companies. Here again, the white companies were
more favorably placed by 5.13 per cent.
Death benefits to total expenses for the Negro com¬
panies was an average ratio of 9.35 per cent. The lowest
ratio being 8.81 per cent. This was .54 per cent more
favorable compared to the Negro companies'" death benefits
to total expenses.
On the basis of the analysis of accumulative pro¬
fits over a period of time and other selected balance sheet
and income statements ratios, several facts were revealed.
All the expense ratios considered showed that those
of the Negro companies were less favorable compared to those
of the white companies. The net investment income to total
assets and to total income ratios were also more favorable
to the white companies than to the Negro companies.
Total premium received for the Negro companies was
$230,447,834; and for the white companies was $172,109,851.
That of the Negro enterprises exceeded that of the white by
$58,345,785. During the same period, total insurance in
force increased by $676,791,000 for the white group and by
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$169,083,000 for the Negro companies.
In short, the selected ratio analysis of balance
sheet and income statements showed that, over a period of
time, the net profits of the Negro ventures exceeded those
of the white. At the same time, net investment income and
total expenses for the Negro companies were less favorable
compared to those of the white companies.
However, the premiums received by the Negro compa¬
nies far exceeded those received by the white firms. The
Negro companies, therefore, made most of their profits, not
by economic operations or profitable investments compared
with the white companies. They made them mostly through
the premiums received.
This was so despite the fact that the Negro insur¬
ance in force was growing only at the average rate of 3.90
per cent, while that of the white companies was growing at
the rate of 12.75 per cent. Furthermore, the total Negro
insurance in force at the end of 1962 was $627,883,000. The
white companies had total insurance in force amounting to
$1,121,762,000--$453,879,000 more than that of the Negro
companies
^Source: Figures used for calculation in the ratio
analysis were obtained from the Best^s Life Insurance Re¬
ports, 1956-1963.
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Marketing s.tjrategy.--Originally, Negro life insur¬
ance companies were started because, among other things,
white insurance companies, as Table 9 shows, charged Negroes
higher premiums than whites for equal protection.
This premium-racial discrimination provided the
Negro life insurer with strong strategy on the basis of
which he sold policies to Negroes by pointing out the un¬
just treatment meted out to them by white insurance compa¬
nies .
At the same time, white companies employed Negroes
discriminately. This provided Negro insurance leaders and
Negro leaders in general with cause to urge Negroes to sup¬
port Negro businesses in which Negro youths could be em¬
ployed.
The marketing strategy of capitalizing on the
racial discrimination suffered two set backs:
(a) Most of the Negro insurance leaders were
less experienced in the art of managing life
insurance companies.
(b) Too much of the funds of the companies were
used to finance celebrations, such as
Lincoln''s birthday, at the expense of policy¬
holders .
TABLE 9
BATES OF TEiE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA,
1881 WEEKLY PREMIUMS^
Age
5 Cents 10 Cents 25 Cents 50 Cents
White Colored White Colored White Colored White Colored
13 117.75 78.00
15 113.00 76.00
20 103.00 68.00 206.00 136.00
25 90.50 60.00 181.00 120.00 452.50 300.00
30 79.00 52.00 158.00 104.00 395.00 260.00
35 67.75 45.00 135.00 90.00 338.75 225.00
40 56.75 37.00 113.50 74.00 283.75 185.00
45 45.50 30.00 91.00 60.00 227.50 150.00 455.00 300.00
50 37.00 24.00 74.00 48.00 185.00 120.00 370.00 240.00
55 29.75 19.00 59.30 38.00 148.75 95.00 297.50 190.00
60 23.25 46.50 30.00 116.25 75.00 232.50 150.00
65 17.00 34.00 22.00 &5.00 55.40 170.00
70 12.50 25.00 62.50 40.00 125.00
75 9.50 19.00 47.50 95.00
P. Burrell,"The Negro in Insurance," Hampton Negro Conference Bulletin,
VIII (Hampton: Hampton Institute Press, 1915), 31.
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As a result, one researcher reported that Negroes
lost "confidence in any and all endeavors sponsored by
Negroes."^ In other words, the Negro companies did not
satisfactorily service the Negro market the companies were
specifically founded to serve. Yet, to this day, life in¬
surance examiners still report Negro life insurance compa¬
nies as companies that issue policies for Negroes. This
tends to restrict their field of operation.
As earlier shown in Table 4, Negro companies still
write mostly industrial policies despite the fact that many
Negroes now earn enough to qualify them for ordinary
policies. The Negro companies have simply not yet been
able to appeal to this new market among the Negroes. They
are still appealing to the traditional market--the indus¬
trial policy market which is nationally shrinking. One re¬
port states that:
The amount of industrial life insurance in force in the
United States reached its peak in 1957, and has been at
about the same level since then. The total at the end
of 1962 was $39.6 billion. The number of industrial
life insurance policies has been declining, and at
year-end 1962, there were 95 million industrial policies
in force.^
J. Trent, Jr., "Development of Negro Life Insur¬
ance Enterprises" (unpiiblished Master's thesis. School of
Business Administration, University of Pennsylvania, 1932), p.ll.
"Life Insurance and American Families," Life Insur¬
ance Fact Book (NewYork: Instituteof Life Insurance, iS63), p. 12 .
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At the beginning, white life insurance companies
did not strategically pay much attention to the Negro market
This lessened competition that Negro life insurance compa¬
nies faced in their predominantly Negro market.
As more Negroes qualified for ordinary policies,
however, white companies began to plan to capture the new
Negro market. Commenting on this new white insurance com¬
panies' market strategy, Kenneth T. Wilson, Manager of Per¬
sonnel Supreme Life Insurance Company of America said:
We are all aware of the constant campaign to attract
this Negro market; and one means devised by many of the
forward-thinking companies, is the employment of quali¬
fied Negroes to establish a link with this Negro market
.... If you consider the percentage of Negro college
graduates, reduce this amount by those who will be
screened from the top by the bid businesses, and those
that will be siphoned away by the government agencies
which are under direct order from the President to hire
Negroes, you will find that the percentage of Negro
college graduates available to us is rapidly diminish¬
ing.^
Besides the pressure on the Negro market by white
companies, such as New York Life with some Negro employees
who write policies worth as much as one million dollars a
month, the studied white life insurance companies have the
^Proceedings of the 43rd Annual Session, National In
surance Association (Chicago: August 19-22, 1963), pp. 64-65




1. Write ordinary policies only instead of mixing
both ordinary and industrial. Mehr and Osier, writing on
industrial policies, reported:
Because the cost is demonstratively higher to the
policyholder, critics have implied that companies make
excessively large amounts on money on industrial poli¬
cies at the expense of the lower income groups for
which they are primarily written,^
The white companies avoid wrecking their public re¬
lations by not issuing industrial policies which are grad¬
ually giving way to ordinary policies.
2. Operate in many widely scattered areas--total of
eighty-seven as compared with those of the Negro companies
totaling thirty-three by the end of 1962. This enables
them to reach more prospective policyholders, and avoid the
risk of concentrating business in a small area or a few
states. Concentration in a limited area is dangerous for
life insurance because if that particular area is hit by
disaster, the loss will be too great for the company.
3. Lower premiums offered by white companies gave
the white companies a market strategy advantage over the
Negro companies.
^Robert L. Mehr and Robert ¥. Osier, Modern Life In¬
surance (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949), p. 38.
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4. General appeal. Nowhere in the report of ex¬
aminers were the white companies described as companies
serving a particular community. They directed their sales
to all American racial groups. The market of the Negro com¬
panies was mainly restricted to the Negro community.
The future outlook of the insurance industry
Despite the apprehension that medical care and increased as
well as extended social security to include more needy
people would slow down total insurance growth, the insurance
in force is continuing to increase. So far, only industrial
policies seem to be affected. In a pamphlet quoted in an
American Life Convention Report, Marion B. Folson ended by
writing:
In our form of society, however, the prime responsi¬
bility rests with the individual to protect himself and
his family against the economic hazards of unemplo3aiient,
illness, premature death and dependent old age. The
government'‘s security programs can only provide the
basic protection. The employer can also assist, but
for the individual to obtain this protection he desires
for himself and his family, to finance the education of
his children and to provide for reasonable comfort in
his old age, he should have a plan of systematic savings.
Fortunately, this philosophy has long been accepted by
our people as evidenced by the substantial growth in
the many forms of savings and insurance.^
^Proceedings of the 55th Annual Meeting, American
Life Convention (Chicago: October 10-14, 1960), p. 347.
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The growth was particularly marked in 1962, in which
life insurance in force of $676 billion was with legal re¬
serve life insurance companies; and in that year:
Life insurance purchases from the life companies--added
up to $79.4 billion which, by a slim margin, was also a
record and made a succession of eleven years in which
the public obtained more new life insurance each year
than ever before.^
When life insurance in force is divided into ordi¬
nary, group, and industrial as the Life Insurance Fact Book
does, it is found that ordinary and group insurance keep a
steady growth. The industrial insurance seems to have
leveled off in recent years.
As can be seen in Illustration 1, the ordinary in¬
surance in force grew gradually from 1922 to 1942, then
grew steadily faster to 1962. Ordinary life insurance in
force is far more than all other forms combined. The total
was $389.2 billion at the end of 1962, an increase of 6.8
per cent over 1961. The average size new ordinary life in¬
surance policy rose to $6,580 in 1962 from $6,300 in 1961.
Group life insurance in the United States began
shortly after World War I. It grew slowly up to 1942, then
faster, and by 1962, American families owned a total of
^Life Insurance in 1962, Life Insurance Fact Book
(New York: Institute of Life Insurance, 1963), p. 5.
ILLUSTRATION I
LIFE INSURANCE IN FORCE IN THE UNITED STATES
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$209.2 billion of group life protection. Illustration 1
demonstrates how fast the growth was between 1952 and 1962.
Nationally, growth of industrial policies has been
very gradual in recent years, and leveled off in 1962. There
was $39.6 billion in force at the end of 1962, and this
amount represented 6 per cent of all life insurance in force
as of 1962. A decade before it formed 13 per cent, while
the percentage was 18 at the end of the Second World War.
In conclusion, it is safe to say that industrial in¬
surance, the average policy of which was $420 in 1962, has
been declining steadily. On the other hand, ordinary and
group insurance has been growing fairly fast because many
more Americans are increasingly being able and willing to





The aim of the study was to determine how well or
badly the growth of selected Negro life insurance companies
compared with the growth of selected white life insurance
companies. In the course of the study, several practices
and results of the two groups of companies came to light.
Growth of assets and insurance in force.--The growth
of assets and insurance in force of the white companies grew
faster than those of the Negro group. On the average of
nine years, 1954-1962, the assets of the white companies as
a group, grew at the average rate of 10.56 per cent. During
the same period, the assets of the Negro group grew at the
average rate of 6.70 per cent. The insurance in force of
the white group grew at the rate of 12.75 per cent; and
that of the Negro companies increased at the rate of 3.90
per cent.
At the same time, the white companies wrote only
ordinary policies. This included whole life, term, group
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and additionals. The Negro group had more industrial poli¬
cies than ordinary policies which were 40 per cent of the
policies in force owned by the Negro group at the end of
1962. This was an increase of 9 per cent from 1953. Na¬
tionally, the growth of industrial policies was declining.
Growth of ordinary policies was rising.
Furthermore, the shares of the white companies were
valued at $10 or $1 par value. The Negro stock companies
valued their shares at $100 par value. The split of shares
into smaller units by white companies would enable them to
have more shareholders if the companies wanted to. The
shareholders who would not otherwise be able to afford units
if the stocks were valued at $100 par value may increase the
goodwill of the companies, and thus help their growth more
favorably compared to that of the Negro companies. The
Negro companies also operated in limited regional areas
totaling thirty-three, compared with the nationally scattered
eighty-seven licensed areas of the white companies of which
premiums were lower than that of the Negro companies by
$3.46.
Net yield, lapse ratio, and operating expenses.--The
sections in Chapter II on net yield, lapse ratio, and oper¬
ating expenses, and the selected ratio analysis of balance
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sheet and income statements in Chapter II showed that the
white companies fared better than the Negro companies.
Average net yield for the Negro companies for eight
years, 1955-1962, was 3.36 per cent; that of the white com¬
panies was 4.30 per cent, .94 per cent higher than that of
the Negro group. At the same time, from 1958-1962, the
Negro companies had most of their investments, about 65 per
cent, in bonds of which net yield was less than that of
mortgage in which the white companies had most of their in¬
vestment- -about 43 per cent.
Average lapse ratio of the white companies was 8.7;
that of the Negro companies, ii.5--2.8 higher than the ratio
of the other group. One cause of this difference may be at¬
tributed to the fact that the Negro companies had more in¬
dustrial policies whose chances of lapsing are greater than
those of ordinary policies the white companies held.
In all respects, as revealed in Chapter II, operat¬
ing expenses for the Negro companies were higher than those
of the white companies. For the Negro companies, average
total expenses for seven years, 1956-1962,^ was 11.2 per
cent of the average assets of the companies average assets
^Source: Yearly total expenses used in Chapter II
for the years 1956-1962, were obtained from the Spectator
Life Index. 1959-1963.
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during the same period. Average expenses to the average
assets for the white companies was 6.12 per cent, 4.08 per
cent lower than the average percentage for the Negro compa¬
nies. Table 6 shows, too, that renewal ratio expenses for
the Negro was higher than the ratio of the white companies.
During the same time, average policy for the Negro
group was $1,121.71, almost one-third of $3,851.89, the
average policy of the white companies. This smaller aver¬
age policy for the Negro could unfavorably affect the oper¬
ating expenses ratio.
Regarding profits over a period of time, those of
the Negro companies exceeded those of the white companies.
This was so despite the fact that the operating expenses
ratios for the Negro companies were higher than those of
the white companies; and net investment income lower. The
Negro companies made their profits mainly through the pre¬
miums collected. They were comparatively higher than pre¬
miums received by the white companies.
Marketing.--In marketing strategy, Negro companies
suffered several setbacks. The early poor public image of
inefficiency created for the Negro companies by the first
American Negro life insurance leaders is, as far as the
writer could conclude from the attitude of some people.
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still remembered and talked about. This is bad for the
growth of the Negro companies. Black T. Newton, Jr., Execu¬
tive Vice President, Institute of Life Insurance, New York,
once remarked: "The success of our whole marketing system
depends on a wholesome public attitude toward our business
and the service it provides."^
Individually, the Negro companies are becoming re¬
latively smaller and smaller than the white companies.
They are, therefore, unable to employ well qualified sales
forces. Furthermore, their approach and examiners'" reports
still restrict their market to the Negro community, while
the white group directs its sales to Americans of all races
in all parts of the United States.
In conclusion, therefore, the writer makes the fol¬
lowing recommendations:
1. That the studied companies work in co-operation
with other Negro companies to eradicate the unfavorable
public relations image the preceding Negro insurance compa¬
nies created by being inefficiently and uneconomically run
at the expense of the then policyholders.
^American Life Convention, Proceedings of the Fifty-
Fifth Annual Meeting (Chicago: American Life Convention,
1960), p. 316.
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2. That the practice of reporting the Negro compa¬
nies as companies which write policies for Negroes be abol¬
ished. This way of reporting restricts Negro companies to
the Negro market. They should strive to extend their market
to all sections of the American community as the white com¬
panies do.
3. That co-ordinated efforts to increase ordinary
policies while giving industrial policies a second place be
exerted. In the long run, such effort will cut down ex¬
penses per dollar of assets owned, reduce lapse ratios, as
well as cut down collection and administrative expenses.
4. Individually, the Negro companies are too small^
to invest in economically large single profitable ventures
or competitively hire well trained employees. They should
therefore strive for faster extension of the services of¬
fered by the National Insurance Association in which most
Negro insurance companies are members. Joint investments,
expert advice, and transfer of investment from less profit¬
able to more profitable securities should, in the long run,
improve investment return and net yield of the Negro compa¬
nies .
^Proceedings of the 43rd Annual Session, National
Insurance Association (Chicago; August 19-22, 1963), p. 61.
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In turn, the increased net yield will enable the
companies to reduce their premiums and declare attractive
dividends, both of which will encourage capital inflow and
growth of insurance in force. Such a move will eventually
increase the rate of growth financed by retained earnings
as well as sales of new investment shares and new policies
written.
5. The Negro stock companies should split their
shares into small easily salable units, such as $10 instead
of $100 par value as they are now, and have them widely
sold. This would tend to eliminate the family-type or
single-owner company and provide a broader base from which
decision making might reflect a more objective outlook to¬
ward insurance as a business.
6. Provide an opportunity for growth and challenge
in the work situation. One comment to the writer by an em¬
ployee in one of the selected Negro companies is revealing;
The stock is almost totally "owned by the company's about
seventy-year-old president who no longer seems interested
in the growth of the company. This state of affairs lowers
the morale of the employees who see no bright future for
them in the company."
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7. Engage in a self-appraisal and evaluation with
the view to recognizing shortcomings, establishing positive
goals and objectives and plan for their attainment.
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YEARLY TOTAL EXPENSES BY COMPANY, 1956-1962
Negro 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
1 1,798,276 1,754,146 1,716,342 1,897,711 2,048,961 1,883,065 1,856,799
2 4,682,370 4,727,344 5,128,182 5,649,226 5,470,718 5,511,661 5,923,840
3 5,252,148 5,708,389 6,100,470 6,600,691 7,244,595 7,696,490 8,443,414
4 1,401,787 1,338,884 1,344,175 1,441,311 1,489,103 1,484,242 1,588,550
Totals 13,154,081 13,528,763 14,289,169 15,588,939 16,253,377 16,575,458 17,812,603
White
A 3,949,505 3,713,616 3,744,953 4,601,743 4,993,587 4,965,932 6,264,276
B 525,420 522,435 422,642 600,869 478,724 476,166 675,284
C 769,336 832,794 702,328 736,482 786,753 723,829 880,162
D 2,391,049 2,239,422 2,352,565 2,780,772 2,903,534 2,906,569 2,806,387
Totals 7,635,310 7,308,267 7,222,488 8,719,866 9,162,598 9,072,496 10,626,109
Source: Spectator Life Index, 1958-1963.
Key:
1. Afro-American Life Insurance Company A. Fidelity Life Insurance Company
2. Atlanta Life Insurance Company B. Great Northwest Life Insurance Canpany
3. North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company C. Guaranty Income Life Insurance Canpany
4. Pilgrim Health & Life Insurance Company D. National Reserve Life Insurance
Company
APPENDIX B
SELECTED BALANCE SHEET AND OPERATIONAL TOTAL FIGURES
ON ACCRUAL BASIS
Items Group 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959
Assets Negro 106,301,469 114,733,106 121,837,932 129,846,445 137,222,617
White 93,842,510 103,888,181 115,799,182 129,650,993 141,556,542
Liabilities N 85,031,802 91,592,342 97,855,720 104,022,760 111,355,760
¥ 82,777,586 92,175,124 103,455,999 114,034,100 125,511,093
Owners' Equity N 21,269,667 23,140,764 23,982,212 25,823,685 25,866,821
W 11,064,924 11,713,057 12,343,183 15,616,893 16,045,449
Premium Received N 25,855,785 27,203,049 27,341,677 28,125,008 29,424,694
¥ 15,720,716 17,656,596 19,193,343 20,547,141 22,419,711
Net Income N 2,528,679 2,898,370 2,384,649 2,778,235 2,428,997
(Profit) ¥ 1,530,299 1,213,521 1,940,771 2,069,744 2,223,883
Total Income N 29,679,485 30,659,054 31,128,911 32,287,535 34,450,725
¥ 19,966,721 22,552,071 24,744,777 25,851,614 28,914,222
Death Expense N 2,531,650 2,773,125 2,772,320 2,806,833 2,918,887
¥ 1,325,672 1,586,585 1,867,274 2,093,522 2,400,912
Commissions N 5,928,169 6,219,024 6,311,825 6,620,742 7,243,730
¥ 2,913,832 3,100,852 3,441,572 3,366,756 3,946,571
Other Expenses N 5,495,678 6,007,170 6,238,277 6,287,906 6,697,594
¥ 2,920,125 3,907,604 3,488,540 3,673,072 4,125,452
APPENDIX B - Continued
Items Group 1960 1961 1962 Average
Assets Negro 143,116,534 150,675,003 158,812,944 133,380,756
White 153,710,888 167,528,601 182,406,400 136,047,912
Liabilities N 117,075,584 124,231,989 131,362,983 107,816,122
¥ 136,630,261 150,178,435 163,252,581 121,001,897
Owners' Equity N 26,040,950 26,443,014 27,449,961 25,504,634
¥ 17,080,627 17,350,166 19,153,819 15,046,015
Premium Received N 29,814,177 30,521,588 32,161,856 28,805,979
¥ 23,965,459 25,358,686 27,248,199 22,263,756
Net Income N 1,618,644 1,550,523 3,272,169 2,432,533
(Profit) ¥ 2,428,418 2,944,858 2,974,394 2,165,737
Total Income N 34,703,149 36,382,950 40,778,048 33,758,732
¥ 31,449,681 33,334,526 36,540,909 28,319,315
Death Expense N 3,101,391 3,021,600 3,203,367 2,891,147
¥ 2,722,492 2,934,631 3,120,651 2,256,467
Commissions N 7,469,097 7,927,462 8,382,048 7,012,762
¥ 4,071,994 4,170,350 4,353,204 3,670,641
Other Expenses N 7,393,928 7,443,701 7,069,921 6,579,272
¥ 4,719,314 4,637,713 5,726,938 4,149,845
APPENDIX B - Continued
Items Group 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959
Total Expenses N 27,150,806 27,760,684 28,754,262 29,509,300 32,022,228
W 18,436,422 21,338,550 22,804,006 24,209,847 26,581,339
Dividends N 721,168 757,243 710,394 889,608 936,546
W 774,308 892,817 1,028,702 1,261,464 1,261,837
Net Investment N 2,933,134 3,316,475 3,611,213 3,815,605 4,120,322
Income ¥ 3,303,912 3,591,122 4,051,858 4,339,997 5,229,843
Source: Best^s Life Insurance Reports, 1956-1963.
Items Group 1960 1961 1962 Average
Total Expenses N 32,435,087 34,308,318 37,130,551 31,133,905
¥ 28,679,505 29,836,020 32,873,981 25,594,959
Dividends N 960,089 1,015,561 1,123,034 889,205
¥ 1,275,623 1,482,445 1,625,131 1,200,291
Net Investment N 4,673,052 4,912,940 4,886,942 4,033,710
Income ¥ 6,170,685 6,815,358 7,792,865 5,161,955
